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This article analyzes the reasons which account for Greece's continuing
membership in the Atlantic Alliance, even though NATO has not lived up
to expectations and has failed to protect the nation's security against threats
from Turkey. Following a brief examination of Greek attitudes toward
NATO and the nat.ure of dissatisfaction, the article argues that strategic con·
cerns are, at best, of secondary importance. Instead, Greece's continuing
membership in the Alliance is a result of the nation's economic ties to the
West and the dependency of its military on NATO and Washington for ad·
vanced training, arms, war materiel, and other professional considerations.
The article concludes that domestic industrial-military complexes of small
countries become closely connected to and often depend on alliance
industrial-military complexes. Leaving military alliances, therefore,
becomes difficult for professional military as well as domestic economic in
terests.

INTRODUCTION
On April4, 1949, nine West European countries plus Canada and the United
States (US) signed a treaty whose goals would be to unite the efforts of the "free
and democratic" nations against what was said to be the advancing forces of In
ternational Communism. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was
born.l Collective security, promotion and protection of democratic values, ter
ritorial integrity, political Independence, security, and respect for each other's
sovereign rights were the basic and fundamental principles agreed upon by the
signators of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Historical, geopolitical, and siTategic considerations, especially in light of the
Soviet-American cold war, convinced the members of the Atlantic Alliance, and
particularly its leading member, the US, to enlarge its southern flank by including
Greece and Turkey in 1952. Viewing it as essential to the "future of the Near and
Middle East" (Wittner, 1982:53), the US, NATO's ultimate policy formulator2
(Fedder, 1973: 123; Kaplan eta!., 1985:XVI), overcame initial British and Scan·
dinavian objections and manag~d to secure Greece's entry into the Allliance. Bat·
tered by the civil war (1946-49), with an economy in shambles, and the old and
"insidious hablt of appealing to one or more powers for help" (Kaltchas,
1940:34-35) still alive, Greek elites saw in NATO a new protector. Operating on
the notion that "neutrality is neither possible nor acceptable" (Loulis,
1984/85:376), and that their nation's se<;uritv interests rested within the
1. Alliance Is defined by Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann and John D. Sullivan as
"a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security
issues." See their Unity and Disintegration In International Alliances: Comparative Studies
(New York: John Wiley and Sons,. 1973), p. 4 . .Stephen M. Walt offers a similar if
somewhat broader deflnition. For him an alliance "is afonnal or infor!1lal arrangement for
security cooperation between two or more sovereign states." See The Origins of Alliances
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 12.
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Alliance,3 Greek political leaders opted for membership, even though they "did
not indeed know much about (or care to discuss publicly) the conditions under
which Greece was joining" (Couloumbis, 1966:49).
In spite of these overwhelming attitudes, membership in NATO has not fully
met Greece's expectations. If anything, the majority of the Greek public as well as
many of the country's leading political elites have repeatedly expressed
dissatisfaction and disappointment with the Alliance's inability or unwillingness to
safeguard Greece's security interests and respect the nation's political sovereign
ty. But in spite of these Greece remains and is likely to continue a full-fledged and
active member in the Atlantic Alliance. The aim of this essay is to identify and
analyze the reasons which have kept this troubled partnership intact. The thesis
the following pages seek to advance and substantiate is that professional military
and economic ties, and not security considerations, account for Greece's conti
nuing membership in the Atlantic Alliance. However, to better understand the
reasons which account for the endurance of this relationship, a brief discussion of
Greek attitudes toward NATO is in order.

ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO
NATO's goals were to safeguard the security, territorial integrity, and political
independence of member states, and to promote freedom, the principles of
democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. Yet NATO has not lived up to
these lofty ideals, as far as the majority of the Greeks is concerned. But the
Alliance alone cannot be assigned the entire blame. Agreeing with the perception
that "NATO's ... strategy [is] an extension of American ... strategy" (Fedder,
1973:125), most Greeks see Washington as equally, if not mostly, responsible
for this breach. Thus, virtually no distinction is made between NATO and
American policies vis-a-vis Greece.
The Alliance is not accused of having failed to protect Greece against threats,
real or imaginary, emanating from the East. Instead, NATO and the US are
reproached for: having intervened in the internal affairs of the country, which in
cluded support for the Colonels' dictatorship (1967-1974); and failing to check
Turkey's.expansionist designs against the territorial integrity of Greece. The latter
2. A distinction is made between the leading and the rest of the numbers. As a super
power the US is a giver rather than a recipient of security-related essentials such as arms,
equipment, and training and therefore is considered more than an "equal" partner in
NATO and other defense alliances to which it belongs. Edwin Fedder states that the Atlan
tic Alliance's strategy is nothing more than "an extension of American personnel,
technology and capital." See his NATO: The Dynamics of an Alliance (New York: Dodd,
Mead and Company, 1973), p. 125. Christopher Jones reached a similar conclusion
regarding the role of the U.S.S.R. in the Warsaw Pact. See his Soviet Influence in Western
Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (New York: Praeger, 1981).
3. Greece is considered a small power. For Robert L. Rothstein a small power is "a
state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities
and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or
developments to do so; the Small Power's belief in its inability to rely on its own means must
also be recognized by the other states involved in international politics." See his Alliances
and Small States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 29.
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includes inability or unwillingness on the part of NATO or the US to side with
Greece regarding the Cyprus issue, and subsequently to preven~ Ankara's inva
sion and occupation of the island; and parallel disagreements between the two
countries over the Aegean, known as the Aegean dispute. The problems and
manifestations surrounding these issues are beyond the scope of this essay and
have been extensively analyzed elsewhere.
Dissatisfaction with NATO has surfaced from nearly all segments of the political
spectrum, save the extreme right. Refiecting widespread discontent with the
Alliance's refusal to support Greece's "just" struggle to unite Cyprus with the
motherland, the pro-Western but widely respected daily Kathemerini openly
urged in 1955 "withdrawal from NATO" (cited in Verney, 198'7:255). Some
years later, frustrated by what was perceived as the Alliance's "tilt" toward Turkey
on the Cyprus dispute, the centrist government of George Papandreou apparent
ly threatened to sever Athens' ties with NATO. The "national unity" government
under the pro-Western Constantine Karamantis, in the wake of the 1974 Turkish
invasion of Cyprus and the Alliance's failure to check Ankara's aggressive
designs, was temporarily forced to pull Greece out of NATO's mihary 'Wing, vow
ing not to return until the occupation troops had vacated the island.
The left has been even more vociferous. The pro-Moscow Communist Party of
Greece (KKE), as expected, has maintained a virulently anti-NATO position. But
the most organized demands in favor. of severing ties with the Alliance came from
.Andreas Papndreou's socialist party (PASO!';), before it came to pow,zr in 1981.
The socialists viewed continuing membership as detrimental to the country's na
tional security interests and blamed NATO and the US for the seven-year dic
tatorship (1967-74), the Cyprus debacle In 1974, and Turkey's aggressive and
intransigent behavior in the 1l\egean. Papandreou stated that even though "we
belong to NATO, this alliance [has] refused to guarantee our frontiers [against
Turkish attacks]" (Time 1981-39). The socialists' argument w&s reinforced by
Brussels' and \Vashington's insistence on viewinH the Greco-Turkish disputes as
outside the jurisdiction of the l'~IATO treaty. NATO poli<::y makers suggested that
the two parties find solutions to their problems through bilateral negotiations -- a
position Athens finds unacceptable and a clear indication of the Alliance's "tilt"
toward Ankara.
As a result of the Alliance's stands, popular sentiments in Greece against
NATO and the US ran high throughout the 1970s, and although they seem to
have subsided somewhat by the mid 1980s, still remain high. For example, a
1977 survey revealed that 61.1% supported withdrawal from NATO, 10.6%
were neutral, and 28.3% supported membership in the Alliance (Kourvetaris
and Dobratz, 1981 :77). A 1985 survey showed that "only roughly one-fourth of
the public ... approves of full NA!O membership, and has co:1fidence in [the
Alliance's] ability to defend \/\/estern Europe" (Dimitras, 1985: 137). A more re
cent public opinion poll found that 52% believe that NATO membersip has been
detrimental to the nation's se:curity interests, and 57% hold the view that align
ment with the US has hurt Greek national interests (Dimitras, 1987:'70). A 1982
study found that 48% had not confidence at all in the US and 39% had very little.
Distrust for the US was found to be "coterminous" with distrust toward NATO
(cited in I<ourvetaris, 1987 :442). More than 90% of Greeks believe that Turkey
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threatens the territorial integrity of their country (Dimitras, 1985: 137). Paul Ken
nedy is on the mark when he observes that "the Greek and Turkish armed forces
often seem more worried about each other than about the Warsaw Pact"
(1987:473).
The menace of International Communism, which was responsible for the for
mation of NATO and Greece's membership in it, is no longer viewed by Greeks
as a threat to the territorial and political integrity of their country. Only 22% of the
respondents saw the Soviet Union as a threat and 19% saw Albania in this light.
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were perceived as dangerous by less than 10%
(Dimitras, 1984). Since 1974, Athens' relations with other Balkan countries,
especially Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania, have improved substantially. A
four-decade long de jure state of war with Albania was recently terminated. Dur
ing the height of the Greco-Turkish conflict of March 1987, when war between
the two NATO partners appeared likely, Prime Minister A. Papandreou dis
patched his foreign minister to Sofia for consultations with the Bulgarian leader
ship. In so far as Athens is concerned, it is Turkey and not the Warsaw Pact that
poses a threat to Greece's security.
In spite of overwhelming sentiments distrusting NATO, Greece remains in the
Atlantic Alliance. In fact, both conservative and socialist governments had to eat
their words. Although public opinion polls indicated that 58% of Greeks favored
"neutrality" and only 12% supported re-entry, the New Democracy government
of George Rallis successfully negotiated Greece's return to the military wing of
NATO (1981), even though the problems which had prompted withdrawal from
the military wing of the Alliance in 1974 had not been eradicated (Melakopides,
1987: 560n). As leader of the opposition A. Papandreou bitterly denounced the
return as a sellout. Later, when he assumed the reins of government (1981), he
stated that Greece would limit its military commitments to NATO (New York
Times, 1981).
Notwithstanding Greece's less acquiescent stance and willingness to differen
tiate its pqsitlon from the Alliance on such issues as the imposition of martial law
in Poland and the downing of the Korean jetliner by the Soviet Union in
September 1983, the Papandreou government gradually mellowed its once
scathing criticism of NATO and the US. Finally in January 1987, citing con
tinu.ous problems with Turkey, Prime Minister Papandreou reversed his previous
stance and categorically declared in Parliament that withdrawal from NATO
"would render war with Turkey inevitable" (cited in Couloumbis, 1987: 15). Even
the severest of the Alliance's critics, the pro-Moscow Greek Communist Party,
seems to have taken a more conciliatory attitude lately. Younger and more
reform-minded party cadre appear prepared to accept continuing membership,
at least for the near future (Petras, 1987: 22).
Why this about face? The explanation given by Greek political leaders is that
strategic imperatives forced both the conservatives and the socialists to swallow
their pride and put the nation's security before political gains and ideological
dispositions. This view, which is supported by a number of academic writings,
assumes that severing relations with NATO would enhance Turkey's strategic im
portance as far as Washington and Burssels are concerned, and correspondingly
would render Greece more vulnerable to Ankara's expansionist designs
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(Coufoudakis, 1985:212; Axt, 1984:204-206; Melakopides, 1987; Papacosma,
1985). According to this argument, the pro-Western Karamanlis and his suc
cessor, George Rallis, never ceased subscribing to the notion that Greece's
strategic interests can best be served within the Alliance. Even the Cyprus dispute
and other difficulties with Turkey can only be dealt with in the Alliance
framework. The decision to withdraw from the military wing of NATO in 1974
was taken as a temporary measure to pacify public opinon, "which demanded an
assertion of independence against the feeble reactions of the allies" (Woodhouse,
1985: 169). Papandreou's public statements, at least, would seem to confirm the
strategic argument.
However, the strategic thesis provides only a partial explanation and may, in
fact, be of less importance than is perceived. If Washington and Brussels failed to
put the brakes on Turkey in the past and continue to take a hands-off attitude
regarding the Aegean, while supporting the Turkish position by suggesting a
negotiated settlement, it is difficult to see how Karamanlis, Rallis, and especially
Papandreou would base their policies to return and remain in NATO solely on the
strength of the strategic position. As late as January 1987, Prime Minister Papan
dreou gave evidence to the contrary during a debate in Parliament: "[l]t has been
demonstrated that NATO has not protected even the frontiers or the national in
tegrity of our country, particularly in the critical region of the Aegean" (Spotlight,
1987:4). Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Yannis Charalam
bopoulos went even further, stating on October 4, 1987 that "NATO is indirectly
supporting Turkey's expansionist designs, and the provocative stance adopted by
the Alliance in the [Aegean] area is increasing tension rather than reducing it"
(Spotlight, 1987:5).
If the Atlantic Alliance did not safeguard Greece's interests in the past, there is
little reason for Karamanlis, Hallis, and more recently Papandreou to think that
NATO will be more forthcoming in the future. Washington and Brussels continue
to view Greco-Turkish problems as beyond the Alliance's jurisdiction and have
unequivocally declined Papandreou's request to guarantee Greece's security in
the event of a Turkish attack. After all, Cyprus was occupied during the time
Greece was a member of the Alliance, not when membership was partially
suspend~d. Re-entry has neither provided ·guarantees against future Turkish ag
gressive behavior nor has it brought solution to the Cyprus and Aegean problems
any closer yet. And who is to say that the country was any more or any less secure
during the partial suspension period (1974-1981)?
Without altogether rejecting the merits of the strategic thesis, there ctppear two
other reasons which seem to provide a better explanation regardinB Greece's
return and continuing participation in NATO: the role of the armed forces, and
economic ties to the West, especially the European Economic Community
(EEC). Let us elaborate on each one separately.

THE ROLE OF THE MIUTARY
In recent decades the separation between foreign and security policies of
nation-states has become indistinct. It is difficult, if not impossible, to perceive that
the formulation of a country's national security policy has no impact on its foreign
policy orientation, and vice versa. In fact, same argue that since World War II,
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security considerations have a more decisive impact on foreign policy (Yarmolin
sky, 1971). Given the paramount role of national security and increasing military
defense budgets, it is only natural for those who specialize in the "stuff" of war
--the military-- to play an important part in the foreign policy of modern states.
The military's professionalization and expertise in handling ever more com
plicated weapons and modes of warfare have strengthened their position and
sharpened their ability to participate in formulating national security affairs;
foreign policy included (Abrahamsson, 1972:19-20; Bietz, 1972).
In addition, professionalization has turned the military into a powerful and po
tent pressure group. The latter, of course, can be important in both developed
and developing policies as well as democratic, totalitarian, or authoritarian
regimes. Thus, the military are able and willing to influence security and foreign
policies either through normative, institutional, and/or group processes or a
combination thereof. If everything else fails, the military, if necessary, can in
fluence the process by means of a coup or a threatened one.
Military professionalization is a function of two processes. One refers to en
vironmental factors such as political stability, level of economic development,
and historical experiences; and two refers to internal socialization processes. En
vironmental factors involve "the creation and maintenance of a complex, effec
tive, and well organized social institution," while the socialization process involves
"the indoctrination and internalization of certain values, outlooks, and behavior
elements" (Abrahamsson, 1972, 16-17; Danopoulos, 1985). This, then, implies
that factors that contribute to the professionalization of a nation's armed forces at
a given time are bound to have a major impact in shaping the attitudes and
perceptions of the military. Participation in defense alliances (such as NATO),
and dependency on them for equipment and support often lead the military of
member states (especially smaller ones) to view participation in and adherence to
the basic principles of a "common bloc" as "positive" and even indispensable, for
they improve "the position of each individual country against the common adver
sary." Concern for the security of the state, which is the primary mission of the
military, "is transformed into a favo~:able opinion for the defense community," in
so far as the officer corps is concerned (Abrahamsson, 1972:83).
The evolution and role of the Greek military exemplify the above description.
Beginning in 1947, American military and economic aid (see Table 1) and subse
quent participation in NATOfacilit&ted the professionalization, autonomy, and
independent posture of the Greek army by providing It wjth funds, equipment,
sophisticated training in allied installations, and support. More than half of the
total aid went to t!:te military. The overall thrust of the training prqgrams was
"dogmatically anti-Communist" and highly pro-NATO oriented, reflecting the
fundamental g9als and p~rceptiqns of American foreign and defense policies
(Wolpin, 1972:52). Since the highly factionalized political parties of Greece pro
vided little comfort to American and NATO policy makers who wanted to see the
country's instability y!elcl to an effective and stable regime, the Western-trained,
fiercely anti-Communist and pro-NATO Greek military was perceived as the in
stitution capable of accomplishing th/i1S€ objectives. Onder the circumstances the
military was transformep into the single most powerful "political force within the
country" (Roubatis, 1979:55), with growing influence in the elaboration of policy
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and a homogeneous, die-hard, right wing organization which no longer reflected
"the contradictions of the political society" (Alivizatos, 1978:37).

TABLE 1. AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO

GRE~~E

(1946-1964 in millions of dollars)

YEAR

ECONOMIC AID
Grants

Loans

1946-48

1949-52
1953-57
1958
1960
1961
1962
1963
196ll

706.7
153.0
15.7
25.6
20.4
20.3:
0.1
0.1

:35.0

12.0
31.0
10.0
31.6
7.7

MILITARY AID

---198.4
323.5
433.:'
143 .-~
116.7
42.8
34.9
85.8
83.2

Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from
r:nt"ernational organfzat"ion:s;A".LD. Special Report,
prepared annually for the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Washington, DC, 1965.
The Greek military's indisputable Atlantic credentials have been displayed
readily in the postwar period. Fearing that a reduction of budgetary appropria
tions for defense, proposed by the Karamanlis government, would weaken
Greece's commitment to NATO, the armed forces were quick to plot in 1962
against the very government they had helped maintain in power (b~/ taking part in
the electoral fraud of a year earlier). Moreover, Greek military officers spoke ap
provingly of the virtues of NATO and its contributions to world peace. The over
whelmingly pro-NATO attitudes of the military contrasted sharply with the anti
American and anti-NATO sentiments prevalent in Greece during and after the
years of praetorian rule.
The military's pro-NATO attitudes became even more apparent in their hand
ling of the Cyprus issue. While publicly prodaiming their support for Enosis
(union of Cyprus with Greece), the praetorian rulers adhered to American
NATO wishes to work out the dispute biiateraliy (with Turkey). Thev undertook a
series of moves -- ranging from political pressure to outright coups -- to force the
Greek-Cypriot leadership to accept a solution certain to lead the partition of the
island-republic. The July 1974 overthrow of President Archbishop Makarios was
but the last scene in a long string of intrigues against the popular Cypriot leader by
the Athens praetorian regime. But the plot backfired, and the Greek military were
forced to return to the barracks amidst public indignation and loss of prestige.
ln spite of this debacle it would be foolhardy to assume that the Greek military
no longer play a role in the elaboration of the nation's security policy. Unlike the
past, the post-junta influence of the officer corps seems to be channeled within
the institutional-legal framework. Greek officers have improved their bctrgaining
capabilities and negotiating skills and have a greater understanding and apprecia
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tion of the processes and virtues of pressure group tactics and politics. More
Greek officers today are versed in foreign languages, especially English and a
greater number of them receive postgraduate training abroad in West European
and American military academies. The US and other NATO countries have been
and remain Greece's primary arms suppliers. For example, between 1964 and
1973, out of a total of $941 million spent toward purchasing arms and other war
materiel, $792 million worth came from US suppliers, $42 million from France,
and $98 million from West Germany. In the 1974-1979 period out of a total of $2
billion, $1.2 billion was spent in the American arms market, $390 million in the
French, $230 million in the German, and $80 million in the Canadian, British,
and Italian combined. The 1981-1985 period reflects an effort by the Papan
dreou government to diversify Greece's sources of arms procurement. From a
total of about $1.9 billion spent on war-related equipment, $95 million worth
came from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, $600 million from other coun
tries (not including Warsaw Pact nations), and the remainder ($1.3 billion) from
the US and other NATO countries. In spite of the latest arms diversification ef
forts, Greece's dependence on the Atlantic Alliance for war materiel remains very
strong (World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985).
Moreover, preoccupation with the Turkish threat is pervasive and the single
most important concern in the country. Almost 20% of total government expen
ditures are devoted to defense, and about 20 out of 1000 people are in military
uniform (see Table 2). Both of these are among the world's highest and have
domestic, economic, soc:ial, and psychological repercussions. The Greco
Turkish conflict has bolstered the standing as well as the influence of the Greek
armed forces in the post-junta period, despite the humiliation the military suffered
as a result of the seven-year dictatorship and the Cyprus debacle.
TABLE 2. GREEK MILITARY EXPENDITURES, ARMED FORCES, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
YEAR

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Source:

M.E. (current
millions
$U.S.)
1467
1903
2045
2157
2196
2132
1954
2404
2377
2195
2515

%ME
GE

MEN IN UNIFORM
(in thousands)

18.7
22.3
20.9
20.4
19.5
18.6
15.9
17.3
18.6
15.0
16.8

186
185
186
187
186
187
186
188
186
177
197

MEN IN UNIFORM
(per 1000 people)
20.7
20.5
20.3
20.0
19.8
19.5
19.3
19.3
19.0
18.0
19.9

Arms Transfers 1986. U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency. Washington, DC, 1987.

~Military Expenditures~
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The dramatic events of the last quarter of a century have not siBnificantly
altered the attitudes of the Greek military with regard to NATO and the US. In
sharp contrast to the civilian society, the military continues to be favorably in
clined toward the Atlantic Alliance and the U.S. Though diminished in intensity,
the East-West conflict provides the context through which Greek officers view the
world, and see NATO as important to the defense of Europe. Agreeing with their
counterpalis in other NATO countries, the Greek military recognizes the need for
the US, as the leading non-Communist power, to play a prominant role in for
mulating the Alliance's strategies. The military also views American participation
in NATO as almost indispensable. Finally, Greek officers see attendance in
Western, and especially American, military academies as important and very
beneficial for professional advancement and promotion. Such perceptions of a
less political but more professional military institution, operating in a security
conscious society, influence Greek security policies, including participation in
NATO. The Soviet·-American rapprochement is unlikely to alter these attitudes in
the foreseeable future.

!ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Although the strategic-military commitment was the primary element in
Greece's relationship with the Atlantic Alliance, economic considerations soon
followed a concomitant path. In the eyes of American and NATO policy makers,
establishment of a viable economy was a necessary prerequisite for social stability
and a pro-Western orientation. Toward this end American economic aid poured
into the war-devastated country (see Table 1), resulting in the integration of "the
Greek economy into the Western economic system as it was being reshaped after
the war" (Thomadakis, 1980:75).
In the initial stages Western involvement in the Greek economy took the form
of government-to-government loans and grants. This public sector cooperation
gradually and increasingly was complemented by private sector linkages. Law
Decree 2687, introduced by the Greek government in 1953, was desig:ned to at
tract foreign capital into the country by providing legal protection as well as a host
of economic incentives to foreign firms investing in the Greek economy. This law
became "the major vehicle for the inflow and penetration of foreign (mainly
Western) investment into the Greek economy" (Thomadakis, 1980:77), con
tributing to economic improvement and "dep;;mdent capitalist industrialization"
(Mouzelis, 1980:254; Evangelinides, 1979; Papandreou, 1981; Freris, 1986;
Gianaris, 1984; Fotopoulos, 1978). By and large American and West European
firms invested in such areas as petrochemicals, metallurgical products, transport
equipment, minerals, paper, and rubber, which amount to over 60% of
manufacturing activity in the country (Evangel.inides, 1979: 189). Tobacco, tex
tiles, food processing, and other traditional areas were left to domestic capital and
control.
The fall of the dictatorship in 1974 and the eventual rise to power of the
socialists ip 1981 did little to lessen Greece's economic dependency on the West.
The nation's total external debt has been steadily rising during the last two
decades. It reached a whopping 17 billion dollars in 1986. Inflation during the
same period has hov,ered at about 20%, and current budget def.cits have been
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climbing at an alarming rate, reaching 3,250 million dollars in 1986, while public
sector borrowing soared to 17.9% of total government spending in the same
year. The level of imports reached 6.655 million dollars in 1986 while exports
stood at 2,850 million dollars (Spotlight, 1987). As before 1974, Greece's main
trade partners have been and continue to be OECD countries. In 1980, 73% of
imports and 80% of exports involved trade with OECD --figures about 30%
higher than during the 1950s and 1960s. Owing to the "stabilization program"
the Papandreou government introduced in late 1985 and the drop in oil prices,
inflation has been brought down to about 12% and there has been a correspon
ding improvement in other areas such as the budget deficit, domestic investment,
and trade. In spite of these, Greece's economic dependency on the West remains
as high as it was in the pre-1974 era. The Economist's assertion that the Papan
dreou government "may be needing American help to climb out of its present
economic hole" is not totally without foundation (1986:39).
Perhaps the clearest example of Greece's dependency on the West is tourism.
Regarded by the present as well as past governments as "a significant factor in the
economic, social, political, and ecological development of the country" (EOT,
1985:19), tourist activity is inexorably tied to the pleasures of vacation-seeking
citizens of the more affluent West. Table 3 makes abundantly clear that on
average, more than 60% of those visiting the picturesque beaches of Greece
come from NATO countries. This lucrative source of revenue is simply too impor
tant to be jeopardized.
TABLE 3. TOURISTS IN GREECE

YEAR

TOTAL #

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987*
1988*

5,557.109
5,463.860
5,258.372
6,027.266
7,039.428
7,340.000
8,004.000
8,360.000

TOTAL FROM NATO COUNTRIES
3,081.673
3,140.440
3,313.012
3,789.268
4,526.275
4,832.000
5,475.000
5,685.000

%OF TOTAL
55.46
57.48
63.30
62.87
64.30
65.83
68.40
68.00

Source: Statistics provided by the New York office of the Greek National
Tourist Organization.

*

estimated

NATO countries have been shown to have both the willingness and the means
to influence events in Athens. For example, in June 1985 President Reagan, in
the wake of terrorist incidents, issued a travel advisory causing a significant
decline in the volume of tourism. In spite of the Greek government's efforts to
condemn terrorism and assure tourists that Greece was a safe place to spend their
vacations, earnings from tourism, one of the country's most important sources of
foreign currency, fell almost 25% short of what had been projected that year.
Remittances and potential investments by the over 2 million Greek-Americans
could also be said to be an avenue through which Washington can influence
economic policy in Athens. Pressure from Greek-Americans certainly caused the
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Papandreou government to reverse its previous decision and to have Truman's
statue restored to the same prime spot where it once stood, before it was da
maged by those opposed to the continuation of American bases in Greece.
Athens is actively courting Greek-Americans to invest in their ancestral land.
Finally, Greece's strong economic ties with its partners in the EEC are another
source of potential economic pressure. For instance, agricultural subsidies have
been important to Greek farmers, and the Papandreou government is in no
mood to jeopardize this source which has helped it gain the favor of rural Greeks.
In spite of its many accomplishments, the EEC has yet to develop a substitute for
NATO. Western Europe still depends on the Atlantic Alliance to act as its defense
umbrella and the jitters displayed by European leaders regarding the impact of the
recently signed INF Treaty between the two superpowers exemplify the impor
tance Europeans attach to the Alliance. Pressure from European leaders, and
especially from fellow socialist Francois Mitterant, may have been instrumental in
convincing Prime Minister Papandreou to abandon his once criticall remarks
against NATO, separate Greco-Turkish issues from those involving the Alliance
and the US, and perhaps move toward an understanding with Turkey. (;iven the
closeness of Greece's economic ties to the EEC it is fair to conclude that Athens
would not risk alienating its European partners by severing its membership in
NATO.

CONCLUSION
The preceding pages sough to analyze the basic reasons which explain
Greece's continuing participation In NATO, even though the country's ex
periences with the Alliance have not lived up to expectations. The most poignant
areas of Greece's discontent with the Alliance have been and continue to be
American, and by implication NATO's, failure to protect the country's security in
terests against threats from another NATO partner, Turkey; and disrespect for
the nation's political sovereignty and independence. Then, the paper analyzed
the reasons which account for Greece's continuing membership in the Alliance,
despite dissatisfaction. The country's pro-Westem and US and NATO-trained
and supplied military, and Greece's strong economic ties with members of the
Alliance, more than strategic considerations, account for the return and continu
ing participation in the Alliance.
Although NATO and the US failed to support the Greek position in disputes
with Turkey, and the Alliance has not lived up to its commitment as far as Greek
public opinion is concerned, econornlc elites and the nation's powerful military
establishment have had little reason to be dissatisfied. To the conservative
political and economic elites American aid, Western investments, and participa
tion in NATO provided and continue to provide security, financial benefits, and
technological know-how. The latter has assumed even more importance if
Greece is to compete effectively within the EEC. The socialists' ideological
dispositions and rhetoric flew in the face of reality. The professional dependency
of the Greek military on NATO for equipment, trainlng, and support has pro
pagated the view that participation in and adherence to the basic principles of the
Alliance is paramount. It is no accident that the military and the more affluent
strata of the Greek society maintain pro-NATO attitudes at a time when public
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opm1on polls consistently show dissatisfaction with the Alliance and the US
(Dobratz, 1987).
In other words, modern defense organizations, such as NATO and the Warsaw
Pact, are more than mere agreements between states to combine their efforts to
repel a common enemy. Instead, they constitute impressive organizations with
permanent command structures responsible for formulating contingency plans to
deal with possible uprising, riots, and other disturbances within member states
which could threaten a member state's commitment to the alliance, in addition to
external threats. It is no accident that the Greek colonels activated a NATO
emergency plan called "Prometheus" to stage their coup in 1967. The latter was
designed to mobilize the Greek army in case of an attempted take-over by the
defeated and factionalized KKE operating in exile from Bucharest, Rumania.
Finally, the business of defense is no longer a part-time effort, but a permanent,
full-time, all-pervasive commitment inseparably tied to every sector of a society.
Modern defense alliances are no different. Domestic defense establishments are
closely tied if not subsumed by alliance efforts. Put differently, domestic
industrial-military complexes are closely connected to and often dependent on
alliance industrial-military complexes. Leaving modern defense alliances, such as
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, becomes difficult not only from a military point of
view, but also from the point of view of domestic economic elites whose con
tinued well-being may be closely fastened to the larger alliance domain. The
Greek-NATO relationship seems to be a case in point.
In sum, barring unforeseen developments (such as the highly improbable
assumption of power by the KKE), Greece is unlikely to sever its relations with the
Atlantic Alliance even if the ongoing contacts between Papandreou and Prime
Minister Ozal of Turkey succeed in eradicating the possibility of war between the
two countries -- a consideration publicly cited by the Greek leader as a justification
necessitating Athens' continuing membership in NATO.
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